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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW–INVERSE CONDEMNATION:
DECISION THAT A TEMPORARY MORATORIUM DOES NOT
AMOUNT TO A COMPENSABLE TAKING SIGNIFIES A
VICTORY FOR LAND-USE PLANNERS
Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo,
2005 ND 193, 705 N.W.2d 850
I.

FACTS

Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. (Wild Rice) is the owner and developer
of a rural residential subdivision located along the Wild Rice River approximately three miles south of Fargo, North Dakota.1 Anton Rutten (Rutten)
owned Wild Rice and acquired the farmland in 1947 in anticipation that it
would one day become a part of Fargo.2 In addition to the possible annexation, Rutten hoped to develop a subdivision on the property.3
In 1993, the subdivision was platted and contained thirty-eight lots,
sixteen of which were located on an oxbow of the Wild Rice River.4 In
1994, the subdivision was incorporated as Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. in
order to continue its development.5 From 1994 to 1997, Wild Rice invested
approximately $500,000 to “develop and promote the subdivision.”6
In April 1997, the Wild Rice River and the nearby Red River flooded
the region.7 All of the undeveloped lots in the Wild Rice subdivision were
underwater.8 After the flood, Fargo worked with the Federal Emergency
1. Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 2005 ND 193, ¶ 2, 705 N.W.2d 850, 852.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. An oxbow is “a U-shaped bend in a river.” THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
517 (New ed. 2004).
5. Wild Rice, ¶ 2, 705 N.W.2d at 852. Anton Rutten was the sole shareholder and only
officer and director of Wild Rice until his death in 2002. Appellee’s Brief at 6, Wild Rice River
Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 2005 ND 193, 705 N.W.2d 850 (No. 20050074). Upon his death,
his widow, Frederica Rutten, became the sole stockholder and their daughter, Bonnie Rutten,
became the president, secretary, treasurer, and manager of Wild Rice. Id.
6. Wild Rice, ¶ 2, 705 N.W.2d at 853.
7. Id. ¶ 3. Prior to the flooding, the City of Fargo experienced a “record snowfall of 140
inches” beginning in February of 1997. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 8. Although the Red
River Valley, encompassing both the Wild Rice and Red River, has a history of flooding, the April
1997 flood was unique to the area in that “[c]ity officials had never before experienced flooding
from the Wild Rice River in addition to flood waters from the Red River.” Id. As a result, the
flood waters “inundated the City of Fargo and surrounding areas causing unprecedented damage.”
Id.
8. Wild Rice, ¶ 3, 705 N.W.2d at 853. Rutten’s partially constructed home, which was on
one of the lots, was also partly damaged. Id. The flood waters came within one foot of the
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Management Agency (FEMA) to develop a plan for future floods.9 The
Wild Rice subdivision was subsumed within Fargo’s extraterritorial jurisdiction on August 1, 1997.10 On June 15, 1998, FEMA created a preliminary flood insurance rate-map for the area, which included several of the
Wild Rice lots in the preliminary floodway.11 The City determined that the
FEMA map was the best information to use in developing a floodway along
the Wild Rice River.12
While FEMA was completing its study of the area, the City continued
to receive requests for building permits in Wild Rice and other areas.13
These requests concerned city officials, due to the areas’ location within the
initial FEMA floodway plan.14 Therefore, the City had to consider the
necessity of allowing construction in the preliminary floodway against the
FEMA regulations.15 On August 10, 1998, the Fargo City Commission
placed a moratorium “on the issuance of all building permits for new construction in the floodway within the City of Fargo and its four-mile extraterritorial zone.”16 The City intended the moratorium to remain in effect until

foundation of Rutten’s home and ground water seeped into the home through a window.
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 9. However, the other existing homes were not harmed. Wild
Rice, ¶ 3, 705 N.W.2d at 853.
9. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853. FEMA had begun to study the Wild Rice River prior
to the 1997 flood, at which time the river had a designated floodplain but no floodway.
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 10. The main difference between a floodplain and a floodway is
that “[a] person can build in the floodplain assuming he or she otherwise meets floodproofing
requirements, but FEMA does not ever allow a person to build in the floodway.” Id. (internal
citations omitted). “The floodplain is the land that would be inundated by a hundred-year flood
event[,] [while] [t]he floodway is the area where the water of the river actually flows to the
hundred–year discharge point.” Id. When the 1997 flood occurred, FEMA was in the initial
stages of developing a floodway and updating a flood insurance rate-map. Id. Following the unprecedented flood in 1997, however, FEMA recommenced the process in order to comprehensively review the area. Id.
10. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853. The City of Fargo’s extraterritorial jurisdiction
amounted to a four mile zone, which surrounded the preliminary floodway and was covered by the
imposition of the temporary moratorium. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 11.
11. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853. The flood insurance rate-map designated a
preliminary floodway for many of the areas in the Red River Valley as well as areas along the
Wild Rice River. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 10.
12. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 10.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 10-11.
16. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853. A moratorium is defined as “a suspension of
activity.” THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 470 (New ed. 2004). “Regulatory agencies
across the country have used temporary moratoria and interim development controls as a legitimate means of creating breathing space while necessary background data is gathered, analyses
conducted, and policies assessed.” Robert H. Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse
Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589, 601
(2002). In general, four main principles underlie the imposition and need for temporary
moratoria. Id. at 602.
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both the Fargo City Ordinances passed, and FEMA made a final determination on the floodplain map.17 Consequently, the moratorium affected several Wild Rice lots during the twenty-one months it remained in effect.18
Rutten’s daughter, Bonnie Rutten, applied for a building permit in May
of 1999 to construct a home on one of Wild Rice’s lots.19 The City of
Fargo denied the permit because the lot was located in FEMA’s preliminary
designated floodway and was covered by the moratorium.20 While the moratorium was in effect, several buyers also showed an interest in purchasing
Wild Rice lots.21 In fact, “one potential buyer signed two purchase agreements and another [buyer] signed a lot-hold agreement.”22 However, the
moratorium’s constraint on the ability to attain permits for construction
prevented the sale of any Wild Rice lots.23
Subsequently, Wild Rice initiated an inverse condemnation action on
March 30, 2000, claiming that the moratorium constituted a taking of its
property.24 In response, the City of Fargo filed an answer on April 21,
2000.25 Fargo’s city engineer recommended, in writing, that the city commissioners lift the moratorium and that FEMA’s June 15, 1998 “preliminary

First, reasonable moratoria allow the regulating body the necessary time to study and
formulate solutions to significant land use and environmental problems affecting
society. . . .
....
Second, temporary moratoria also constitute a valid response to imminent public
health and safety threats. . . .
....
The third principle underlying the need for temporary planning moratoria is the
prevention of nonconforming uses or development inconsistent with the purposes and
policies of the planning legislation being formulated. . . .
....
[Finally,] [t]he fourth principle underlying temporary planning moratoria is the
facilitation of public debate and input into the legislative process.
Id. at 602-05.
17. Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853.
18. Id. Several of the Wild Rice lots were affected by the moratorium due to their location
within the preliminary floodway developed by FEMA in June of 1998. Appellee’s Brief, supra
note 5, at 11. FEMA’s floodway approval process generally takes eighteen months. Id. at 10.
Therefore, the City believed the floodway designation process would be complete within a similar
amount of time, during which time, city, state, and federal officials met to discuss “flood plan
mitigation issues.” Wild Rice, ¶ 4, 705 N.W.2d at 853.
19. Wild Rice, ¶ 5, 705 N.W.2d at 853.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. ¶ 6. Rutten also based his suit against the City of Fargo on a claim of tortious
interference. Id.
25. Id.
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flood insurance rate-map panel [serve] as the governing panel for all floodprone areas.”26 Therefore, the city commission voted to lift the moratorium
during a public hearing on May 1, 2000.27
After the City of Fargo lifted the moratorium, Wild Rice sold five of its
lots.28 A potential buyer who signed a purchase agreement while the moratorium was in place, purchased a lot for $32,900 in May of 2000.29 “Lots
were also purchased in March 2002 for $39,000, in November 2002 for
$39,000, in July 2003 for $55,900, and in April 2004 for $59,900.”30 Other
sales were also pending during these proceedings.31
Wild Rice’s inverse condemnation lawsuit appeared before Judge
Douglas R. Herman in the District Court of Cass County, East Central
Judicial District, North Dakota on October 25-28, 2004.32 Wild Rice challenged the moratorium, alleging that the government exceeded its power to
restrict land use by limiting Wild Rice’s property rights, which effectively
amounted to a taking.33 Wild Rice asserted its inverse condemnation claim
under both the federal and state constitutions.34
The district court dismissed the claim after a bench trial.35 The court
concluded that the twenty-one month moratorium imposed by the City of
Fargo did not constitute a taking of Wild Rice’s property.36 Wild Rice
appealed the dismissal to the North Dakota Supreme Court.37 Wild Rice
asserted that the “[trial] court erred in dismissing its claim for inverse condemnation because Fargo’s [twenty-one]-month moratorium constituted a
‘taking’ of its property.”38 The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed and
affirmed the trial court’s decision.39

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. ¶ 7.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 5, at 5.
33. Wild Rice, ¶ 9, 705 N.W.2d at 854.
34. Id. ¶ 11.
35. Id. ¶ 8, 705 N.W.2d at 853-54.
36. Id. at 853. Additionally, the trial court ruled in favor of Fargo by determining that “no
malicious interference with third-party contracts” had occurred. Id. at 853-54. The court also
denied Wild Rice’s post-trial motions. Id. at 854.
37. Id. ¶ 1, 705 N.W.2d at 852.
38. Id. ¶ 9, 705 N.W.2d at 854.
39. Id. ¶ 1, 705 N.W.2d at 852.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Property plays a crucial role in American society.40 Although property
is not defined in the United States Constitution, the opportunity to acquire
and possess property is a right recognized as one of the foundations of our
political system.41 In fact, “‘[t]he protection of property ownership is a
fundamental theme’ in the Constitution” at both the federal and state
levels.42 Therefore, to adequately address the importance of property ownership in the United States, this section will focus on the role that property
has played through a presentation of both the federal and state takings
jurisprudence.
A. FEDERAL TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
In general, the United States Supreme Court has defined real property
broadly.43 Conversely, the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution has been narrowly applied.44 The Takings
Clause provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”45 In this context, the term “takings” refers to
situations where property owners are compelled to transfer their interests in
real or personal property to governmental entities.46
However, the Takings Clause does not automatically prohibit governmental interference with property rights.47 Instead, the Clause’s purpose is
to ensure that property owners are compensated when the government takes

40. See Brian J. Nolan, Note, The Metaphysics of Property: Looking Beneath the Surface of
Regulatory Takings Law After Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 703, 708 (2004) (“Property rights hold a unique place in the
American system.”).
41. Id.
42. Akke Levin, Note, Camping in Lake Tahoe: Does a Temporary Deprivation of All
Beneficial Use of Land Justify Rejection of the Categorical Lucas Rule?, 4 NEV. L.J. 448, 449
(2004) (quoting Kimberly Horsely, Comment, The Abnormalcy of Normal Delay, 28 PEPP. L.
REV. 415, 415 (2001)).
43. Inversely Yours: Substantive Issues in Inverse Condemnation, Continuing Legal Education at Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., Houston, Tex. (Jan. 5-7, 2006) available at SL049 ALI-ABA 623,
628. Property has been held to include not only real estate and personal property, but also such
things as easements, trade secret rights, valid contracts, franchises, and trade routes. Id. at 628-29.
44. Id. at 628.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. “While the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that the government must pay just compensation for any land taken for public purpose is straightforward, it
has proven difficult in application.” Martin J. Foncello, Comment, Adverse Possession and
Takings Seldom Compensation for Chance Happenings, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 667, 668 (2005).
As a result, federal takings law is relatively unsettled. Id. at 667-68.
46. Brent L. Slipka, Case Comment, Constitutional Law—Inverse Condemnation: Supreme
Court Gives Property Owners New Rights, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), 78
N.D. L. REV. 177, 179 (2002).
47. Levin, supra note 42, at 449.
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their property for public use.48 The Takings Clause effectively serves as a
guarantee “designed to bar government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”49 This section explains the progression of the
Takings Clause through the United States’ Supreme Court’s decisions
regarding: (1) regulatory takings; (2) a per se categorical rule for regulatory
takings; (3) an ad hoc factual inquiry for regulatory takings; and (4)
temporary regulatory takings.
1.

Regulatory Takings

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated the
Takings Clause, thereby making it applicable to the states.50 Nonetheless,
when a state seeks to deprive a private property owner of their property, the
Due Process Clause only affords the state the right to do so through preexisting laws and other forms of fair adjudication.51 One such way that a state
may regulate private property is through an exercise of its police power.52

48. Id. Under the Takings Clause, “[t]he ‘public use’ limitation prescribes that the government may not take land for whatever purpose it pleases, but may only take for a public purpose.”
Foncello, supra note 45, at 672. Additionally, this limitation requires that for a taking to be
considered for public use, it must bear a rational relationship to a conceivable public purpose. Id.
When making this determination, reviewing courts show deference to the decisions of the
legislature regarding what constitutes a public use and it is generally believed that few takings fail
to meet this standard. Id. at 673. “The second limitation, the payment of ‘just compensation,’ is a
fundamental limitation on the actions of the state.” Id. It basically provides that property owners
should be “fully indemnified for the loss sustained when his property is taken for public use.” Id.
However, private property owners are only compensated for the losses that they actually suffer,
not for benefits gained by the government. Id.
49. Levin, supra note 42, at 449-50 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)). This principle was first recognized in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960), and later enshrined as the “Armstrong principle” in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320-21 (2002). Steven J. Eagle, Planning
Moratoria and Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court’s Fairness Mandate Benefits
Landowners, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 442 (2004); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (restating the principle set forth in Armstrong); Armstrong,
364 U.S. at 49 (establishing the principle that governments should not be allowed to force
individual landowners to bear public burdens alone and stressing the importance of the quest for
fairness and justice in takings determinations); “Character of the Governmental Action” in
Takings Law: Past, Present, and Future, Continuing Legal Education at George Mason University
School of Law, Arlington, Virginia (Apr. 22-24, 2004) available at SJ052 ALI-ABA 459, 464-65
(discussing the decision in Armstrong and reiterating the importance of the concepts of fairness
and justice in takings determinations).
50. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005). The Fourteenth Amendment
was made applicable to the states when it was adopted in 1868. Carl Kirk, Note, First Church
Decides Compensation is Remedy for Temporary Regulatory Takings—Local Governments are
‘Singing the Blues,’ 21 IND. L. REV. 901, 904 (1988).
51. Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
187, 196 (2004) [hereinafter Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court]. On its own, the Due
Process Clause does not guarantee any substantive rights. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
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State and local governments have broad authority to enact land use
regulations through their police power.53 This authority essentially enables
governments to impose regulations without having to compensate the landowners whose property is restricted.54 Initially, these land use regulations
were not subject to scrutiny under the Takings Clause.55 Instead, only
situations of direct government appropriation or actual physical invasion of
a person’s private property were deemed to be Fifth Amendment Takings. 56
However, over time, the United States Supreme Court began to classify
certain government regulations of private property as compensable Fifth
Amendment Takings because the regulations were so substantial that the
effect created a “regulatory taking.”57
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,58 the United States Supreme Court
first recognized the concept of “regulatory takings.”59 In Mahon, the
Pennsylvania Coal Company sold surface rights to specific parcels of
property while reserving the right to mine the coal beneath.60 The company’s property and contract rights were subsequently affected by a statute
which forbade “the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the
subsidence of . . . any structure used as a human habitation.”61
§ 1, cl. 3 (providing through the Due Process Clause no state shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
52. David A. Thomas, Finding More Pieces for the Takings Puzzle: How Correcting History
Can Clarify Doctrine, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 499 (2004).
53. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D. 1983). The concept of police
power has been understood as the authority through which state or local governments regulate
property and land use for an appropriate public purpose. Thomas, supra note 52, at 499. Appropriate public purposes under the police power involve “land use regulations that preserve or
protect the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.” Id. at 544.
54. Rippley, 330 N.W.2d at 507. Generally, the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation for a taking of private property for public use. Thomas, supra note 52, at 544. When
enacting land use regulations under the police power, however, a requirement for compensation
under the Fifth Amendment is not presumed. Id. This lack of compensation is likely related to
the fact that the use of the police power comprises a much narrower category than that of general
public uses under the Takings Clause. Id. Historically, police power regulations have generally
been limited to “regulating conduct to which the landowner had no right anyway,” primarily as a
means to prevent landowners from using their land in a manner which amounted to a nuisance. Id.
at 545. No landowner has a right to use their land in this way; therefore, no loss or “taking” of
anything was caused by the regulation. Id. at 543-44.
55. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
56. Id. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, “it was
generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, or the
functional equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession.’” Id. (quoting Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (emphasis in original)).
57. Id.
58. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (discussing the Mahon Court’s
decision that certain “regulatory takings” are compensable under the Fifth Amendment).
60. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
61. Id. at 412-13.
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In its decision, the Mahon Court focused on whether the statute constituted a legitimate exercise of police power in regulating a potential safety
threat to surface owners.62 The Mahon Court determined that the statute’s
prohibition made it impossible for the company to mine coal and, in essence, completely destroyed all of the rights that the company had reserved
from the surface landowners.63 As a result, the Court found the statute to be
invalid because the prohibition amounted to a “taking,” for which just
compensation had not been paid.64
The Court recognized that the United States Constitution protects private property ownership from physical appropriation.65 This protection is
afforded by the limits placed on the government’s power to define a property owner’s interests.66 These limitations serve as a fundamental check on
the government’s ability to restrict the rights of private property owners.67
Without these limits, human nature itself would naturally cause the unchecked restriction of property and ultimately the disappearance of all
private property.68
These considerations led to the adoption of a general rule that “while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if [a] regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking.”69 However, the decision in Mahon offered
little guidance as to when, and under which circumstances, a given
regulation would be seen as having gone “too far” under the Takings
62. Id. at 413-14.
63. Id. at 414. The Pennsylvania Coal Company could not be forbidden from mining the
coal through the state’s exercise of its police power, because the company reserved the right to
mine it through the deed maintained by the homeowners. Id. Therefore, the homeowners had
waived their claims to damages from this mining. Id. Damage to a single house also does not
constitute a public nuisance justifying the use of the state’s police power because it is not common
to all homeowners of the area or public in nature. Id. at 413. However, even if it was common to
all homeowners in the area, the homeowners still deeded away their right to claim damages of this
sort by allowing the company to reserve its right to mine the coal. Id. at 416.
64. Id. at 414-15; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 12728 (1978) (discussing the Court’s holding in Mahon).
65. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014
(1992) (discussing Justice Holmes’ reasoning in Mahon).
66. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16.
67. Id. at 415.
68. See id. (providing that when the “seemingly absolute protection [of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments] is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears”).
69. Id. Generally, a taking has been determined to likely occur “when a regulation concentrates economic injuries disproportionately on a few individuals.” Charles V. Dumas, III, Note,
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency: The Supreme Court
Reaffirms the Importance of Land-Use Planning and Wisely Refuses to Set Concrete Outer Limits,
53 CATH. U. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003). When making determinations of this sort, the law
specifically seeks to find a “middle ground between avoiding individualized economic burdens
and meeting the goals of necessary land-use planning.” Id. In essence it strives to “strike a
balance between the rights of individual property owners and the public.” Id.
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Clause.70 As a result, the determination of what constitutes a “taking” for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment has been met with considerable
difficulty.71
2.

Per Se Categorical Rule of Regulatory Takings

In an effort to clarify the uncertainty surrounding the determination of
when a regulation goes “too far,” the United States Supreme Court has
established two bright-line rules.72 These bright-line rules are applicable
when a physical invasion has occurred and where a regulation denies all
economic use of property.73 The bright-line, or categorical per se rule, was
first recognized in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council74 and applied
to regulations denying all economic use of property.75
In Lucas, a takings claim was alleged in response to a ban placed on
coastal development.76 A property owner purchased beachfront lots and
had planned to build single-family homes.77 Two years after his purchase,
the state of South Carolina enacted legislation that established an erosion
line and barred all new development within twenty feet of the erosion line. 78
This legislation prevented the property owner from building on his lots due
to their location within twenty feet of the erosion line.79 The Court determined that a regulatory taking had occurred because the legislation
essentially deprived the property owner of all reasonable economic use of
his property, thereby rendering the property valueless.80
The Lucas Court reiterated the now famous passage from Mahon:
“[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”81 The Lucas Court determined

70. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
71. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
72. A Short History of Regulatory Takings—Where We Have Been and What are the Hot
Issues of Today, Continuing Legal Education at Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California
(Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 2005) available at SL012 ALI-ABA 1, 25.
73. Id. at 25.
74. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016.
76. Id. at 1009.
77. Id. at 1006-07.
78. Id. at 1007.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1029-30; see also Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 206
(discussing the Court’s holding in Lucas).
81. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (quoting Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
In his explanation of the distinction between total and partial restraints, Justice Scalia, who wrote
the majority opinion, stated that:
[I]n the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use
of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the
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that property owners have suffered takings when they are required to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of their property by leaving the property economically idle.82 In these instances, the property owners do not
receive any benefit in return for giving up specific rights or uses to their
property as required by and set forth in the regulation to aid the common
good.83 As a result, property owners are forced to bear public burdens
alone, while not receiving any benefit in return for their property.84 Also,
the State can avoid compensating a property owner only if the proscribed
uses were not part of the property owner’s title when it was acquired.85 In
essence, the Lucas per se rule seeks to prevent private property from being
“pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm” through the government’s exercise of its police
power.86 The Lucas decision resulted in a major victory for property
owners because it provided that regulations, which deprive landowners of
all economic use of their land, amount to takings that require compensation.87 This principle holds true regardless of whether important governmental interests are served by the regulations.88
However, the Court stressed that this per se rule only applies in those
cases where a regulation denies a property owner all beneficial use of his or
legislature is simply ‘adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life.’ [Rather,
such regulations] carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm.
Id. at 1017-18 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(cited in Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 206)).
82. Id. at 1019; see also Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 206
(“[A]n owner suffers a per se taking when his economic losses reach 100%.”).
83. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18; see also Levin, supra note 42, at 455 (discussing the
application and effect of the categorical rule created by the Lucas court).
84. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
85. Id. at 1027; see also Dumas, supra note 69, at 215 (reiterating the principle set forth in
Lucas).
86. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018; see also Kimberly A. Selemba, The Interplay Between Property
Law and Constitutional Law: How the Government (Un)Constitutionally “Takes” Land Dirt
Cheap, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 657, 662 (2003) (discussing the categorical per se rule recognized
in Lucas). The Lucas Court proffered three reasons in support of its determination that a
deprivation of all economically beneficial use of land amounts to a taking. Ann Oshiro, Note,
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: A Significant Ripple
in Takings Jurisprudence, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 167, 186 (2004). First, the Court reasoned that it is
unrealistic to simply assume that the government has adjusted the benefits and burdens of economic life in order to secure an average reciprocity of advantage to all property owners and parties
concerned. Id. Second, the Court determined that requiring the government to compensate
property owners will not have a negative impact on the government’s power and ability to regulate
because the Lucas rule only applies in rare situations. Id. Third and finally, the Court reiterated
the belief that if compensation is not required in situations where the categorical Lucas rule
applies, it creates a risk of forcing property into the realm of public service. Id.
87. Oshiro, supra note 86, at 178-79.
88. Id. at 179.
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her property.89 As a result, even when a regulation diminishes the value of
a landowner’s property by ninety-five percent, the Lucas framework does
not apply.90 Therefore, anything less than a total taking must be analyzed
under a partial taking analysis.91
3.

Ad Hoc Factual Inquiry for Regulatory Takings

State and federal governments regularly impose regulations which do
not deprive landowners of all economically beneficial use of their property.92 Nevertheless, regulations still restrict the ability of property owners
to use their property.93 Therefore, under certain circumstances a regulation
can amount to a “partial regulatory taking.”94 The United States Supreme
Court has not developed a bright-line formula to determine when justice
and fairness require the government to compensate landowners’ economic
injuries.95 In turn, this determination is often made on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account the particular circumstances involved.96
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,97 the United
States Supreme Court recognized that when engaging in these case-by-case
determinations, or “ad hoc factual inquiries,” several factors are particularly
significant.98 These factors are “[(1)] [t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant[;] . . . [(2)] the extent to which the regulation has

89. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n.8. Additionally, the categorical Lucas rule does not apply
when a regulation only amounts to a prohibition of a use that has been recognized as a common
nuisance. Levin, supra note 42, at 455.
90. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, n.8.
91. Levin, supra note 42, at 455.
92. Dumas, supra note 69, at 216. Zoning laws provide an example of regulations that do
not deny a landowner of all economically beneficial use of their property. Id. at 216 n.47. A
specific example of a zoning regulation would be that of “[a] landmark preservation ordinance . . .
that prohibits certain types of property development [and] may affect the value of that property
without rendering it valueless to the owner.” Id. at 216. “While zoning at times reduces
individual property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude
that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be benefited by
another.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). Therefore, zoning laws have been consistently viewed as
permissible governmental actions even when the laws prohibit the most beneficial use of the
property. Dumas, supra note 69, at 218.
93. Dumas, supra note 69, at 216.
94. Id. A “partial regulatory taking” has been defined as a deprivation which is less than the
entire use or value of the property or interest therein. Eagle, supra note 49, at 461.
95. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
96. Id.
97. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
98. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
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interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[;] . . . [and] [(3)] the
character of the governmental action.”99
In Penn Central, a property owner brought a takings claim against the
City of New York after the city refused to approve construction plans for a
fifty-story office building over Grand Central Terminal.100 The construction was not approved due to the City’s designation of Grand Central
Terminal as a landmark under New York City’s Landmarks Preservation
Law.101 The Supreme Court ruled that a taking may occur under a land
regulation even where that regulation falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial use.102 Moreover, when analyzing potential takings, the
parcel of property in question must be viewed as a whole and not divided
into segments to determine if the rights of one segment were completely
extinguished.103
“There are practical planning and administrative reasons for considering the entire property when determining whether regulatory impact
amounts to a taking.”104 After all, if courts based their takings analysis only
upon the affected parcels, serious consequences would likely result.105
Specifically, the government would have to compensate property owners
99. Id. These factors have been referred to as the “Penn Central analysis.” Slipka, supra
note 46, at 181. Based on these factors, “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good.” Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (internal citations omitted).
For discussions of the economic impact factor, see, e.g., Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 57
Fed. Cl. 115, 123 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (“[T]he proper measure of economic impact is the comparison
of the market value of the property immediately before the governmental action with the market
value of that same property immediately after the action.”); Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873
So. 2d 460, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that the economic impact criterion of the Penn
Central analysis requires a plaintiff to establish a serious financial loss as a result of the
regulation).
For discussions of the character of governmental action factor, see, e.g., Bass Enters. Prod.
Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (recognizing that a taking can result
when an extraordinary delay, which the Supreme Court and other courts have defined as requiring
a “substantial length of time,” occurs in the governmental decisionmaking process); Appollo
Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717, 737 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (relying on the Wyatt decision’s
determination that takings can result from extraordinary delays in the governmental decisionmaking process only upon a finding of extreme circumstances); Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d
1090, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that takings may occur through an extraordinary delay in
the governmental decisionmaking process, however, acknowledging that a delay must be substantial and that delays lasting up to eight years have been condoned by the Supreme Court); Byrd v.
City of Hartsville, 620 S.E.2d 76, 82 (S.C. 2005) (holding that a two-month delay did not amount
to a taking and that the City’s zoning regulation was not unreasonable).
100. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115-19.
101. Id. at 115-16.
102. Id. at 124 (outlining the pertinent factors for analysis).
103. Id. at 130-31.
104. Freilich, supra note 16, at 616.
105. Id.
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for de minimis impacts caused by regulations, regardless of the remaining
usefulness of the parcels as a whole.106
Ultimately, the Court held that Penn Central did not suffer a taking.107
The Court found that the property owners retained beneficial use of their
property, including the opportunity to enhance and develop additional properties in their possession.108 Also, the Court determined that the company
based its claim primarily on development potential, which was a dimension
of property not recognized under the factors set forth by the Court.109
Penn Central serves as the main guide in the resolution of regulatory
takings claims falling outside the scope of physical takings or those
depriving owners of all economically beneficial use of their property.110
When the Court decides regulatory takings claims, it balances an owner’s
lost economic value and expectations against the social value the government hopes to gain through the regulation.111 Instead of supplying precise
variables, this balancing test provides important guideposts to use in the
final determination of whether just compensation is required.112 Penn
Central essentially refined the holding of Mahon to conform it to modern
sensibilities and firmly established a basic interest balancing test for
regulatory takings.113
As a whole, this analysis favors the government.114 It presumes that
regulations have high social value if they are reasonably related to the
promotion of general welfare.115 Nevertheless, when a regulation causes a
property owner to experience a concrete economic loss, the analysis favors
106. Id.
107. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138. The Court determined that “[t]he restrictions imposed are
substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare.” Id.
108. Id.
109. Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 197.
110. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
111. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1549, 1556 (2003) [hereinafter Claeys, Takings].
112. Dumas, supra note 69, at 220.
113. Oshiro, supra note 86, at 176; see also Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra
note 51, at 192 (stating that the Penn Central decision “announced a utilitarian interest-balancing
formula”).
114. Claeys, Takings, supra note 111, at 1557.
115. Id. The social gains expected by the regulation are “concrete, immediate, and substantial” whenever it is found to be “‘reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare.’”
Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 193 (quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978)). “On the other side, any social gains
from protecting the institution of property rights seem diffuse and remote.” Id. The deferential
nature of this analysis places it at odds with other balancing tests in property law. Claeys,
Takings, supra note 111, at 1557. These other tests have a tendency to discount the social value of
given land uses if they interfere with an owner’s ability to exercise free action over his or her
property. Id. For example, nuisance law stresses that “it is in the general public interest to permit
the free play of individual initiative within limits.” Id.
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the property owner.116 In general, however, the decision in Penn Central
further provides support for the government.117 After all, in Penn Central’s
wake, property owners, in essence, relinquished their right to complain about their inability to develop undeveloped property or to use their property
for other purposes.118 As long as the owner retains some use of their property, the law discourages complaints based on the potential to develop other
uses.119
4.

Temporary Regulatory Takings

In the case of temporary regulatory takings, all reasonable use of the
property has not been destroyed because future uses remain.120 When temporary regulations restrict the use of property, it is only the temporal aspect
of the property that is affected, not all of the rights and uses associated with
it.121 As a result, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,122 the Supreme Court decided that Lucas’s per
se rule is inapplicable in cases involving temporary takings.123
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed a
thirty-two month moratorium to protect the water clarity of Lake Tahoe by
barring the development of specific zones surrounding the lake.124 The
main issue in Tahoe-Sierra involved a determination of whether a temporary taking of this nature sufficiently impeded all economically viable
uses of the property so as to constitute a taking under the Lucas standard.125
The Tahoe-Sierra Court found that if a regulation is temporary in nature, or
if any value or use remains with the property, the Lucas per se standard is
inapplicable.126

116. Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 51, at 193.
117. Id.
118. See id. (explaining that as long as owners are left with some use of their property, the
law discourages complaints about their potential to develop other uses).
119. Id.
120. Freilich, supra note 16, at 615.
121. Id. at 614.
122. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
123. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333. The Tahoe-Sierra Court recognized that the categorical
Lucas rule was carved out for the “‘extraordinary circumstance’ in which the government deprives
a property owner of all economic use.” Id. at 337 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992)).
124. Id. at 306-07.
125. Id. at 306; see also Freilich, supra note 16, at 592-93 (discussing the factual background
and issues presented in Tahoe-Sierra).
126. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32. “No court has yet held that a temporary moratorium
can result in a Lucas-type taking. Indeed, all the decisions are to the contrary.” Freilich, supra
note 16, at 613. Additionally, in its determination that the Lucas standard does not apply to
temporary takings of this sort, the Court has confirmed that Penn Central continues to remain the
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In Tahoe-Sierra, the moratorium only placed a ban on the property for
a limited period of time and, therefore, the future developmental use of the
property was preserved.127 Future developmental use has substantial present value, which differentiates it from a permanent ban on the development
of property.128 The Tahoe-Sierra Court further explained, “[g]iven the
importance and long-standing use [of] temporary moratoria, courts should
be exceedingly reluctant to adopt rulings that would threaten the survival of
this crucial planning mechanism.”129
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court also determined that delays in the sale or
development of property during the imposition of a temporary land use
regulation may result in fluctuations in value.130 Nonetheless, these are
simply incidents of ownership and do not justify compensation.131 The
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island132
further evidenced this reasoning.133

dominant case in the field of regulatory takings. Claeys, Takings on the Rehnquist Court, supra
note 51, at 214.
127. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32.
128. Freilich, supra note 16, at 594.
129. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 777
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 948 (2001) (cited in Freilich, supra note 16, at 594).
Freilich explains that:
Interim development controls and moratoria are fundamental to a rational, defensible,
planning process. . . . [Courts] since that time have recognized that a temporary halt on
development activity during a period of study is not only reasonable, but also ensures
that [a] government acts in a manner that is thoughtful and deliberate, not arbitrary and
capricious.
....
The reasonableness of a moratorium is measured by both the length of its duration and
its relation to the underlying studies supporting change in the regulations. Thus, an
enacting authority must diligently pursue completion of the planning process,
including studies, analyses, public participation, and the drafting of legislation. The
need for the moratorium is justified by the need to pursue further study of the matter at
hand. If, however, having established a legitimate need, the government fails to
pursue the necessary studies or to work diligently toward resolution of the matter, the
substantive validity of the moratorium can be called into question.
Moratoria have been set aside under substantive due process grounds when the
restraint has been determined to be accompanied by studies unreasonable in scope,
adopted in bad faith, or otherwise arbitrary or capricious. Where the government
enacts a moratorium with the intent of blocking a specific development, with no
legitimate, good faith interest in addressing a larger planning or environmental
concern, unlawful discrimination may be found.
Freilich, supra note 16, at 600-01.
130. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9
(1980)).
131. Id.
132. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
133. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632.
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In Palazzolo, a landowner brought an inverse condemnation action
against the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program
(CRMP), following the enactment of a regulation that protected coastal wetlands.134 The landowner claimed that the regulation resulted in a taking of
the landowner’s property without compensation and thereby violated the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.135 The landowner further asserted that
the regulation deprived him of all economically beneficial use of his
property.136
In Palazzolo, the Court found that the landowner had not been deprived
of all economic value because the property retained significant worth in its
future developmental value.137 The Court specifically reasoned that “[a]
regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence . . . does
not leave the property ‘economically idle.’”138 As a result, the Palazzolo
Court ultimately held that a reduction in the value of property due to a
governmental regulation is not sufficient to amount to a taking.139 Instead,
a property owner must show that the regulation resulted in a deprivation of
all economically beneficial value.140 Therefore, the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause had not been violated, and the property owner was not
entitled to just compensation.141
The Takings Clause has played a critical role in the development of
federal takings jurisprudence.142 However, since this clause was made applicable to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, it has also greatly affected state takings jurisprudence.143 Therefore, it is crucial to pay attention to the effect the Takings
Clause and its state counterpart have had on the development of North
Dakota’s takings jurisprudence.

134. Id. at 614-15.
135. Id. at 615.
136. Id. at 615-16.
137. Id. at 616.
138. Id. at 631 (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 631-32.
141. Id.
142. See generally Foncello, supra note 45, at 667-68 (“The Takings Clause has become a
hotbed of the Constitution, with its panoply of precedent stretching and twisting to fit into the
year’s new litigation, potentially as numerous as the regulations that invade every aspect of our
modern life.”).
143. See Kirk, supra note 50, at 904 (discussing the effect of the application of the Takings
Clause to the states).
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B. NORTH DAKOTA TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
The North Dakota Constitution, similar to the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause, provides a guarantee that “[p]rivate property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”144 The North
Dakota Supreme Court determined that the state constitution provides an
even broader protection for property owners against takings than the federal
constitution.145 The North Dakota Constitution was intended to afford landowners the right to possess property in addition to those rights which make
property valuable.146 As with the United States Supreme Court, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has not created a set formula or clear guidelines in
its takings jurisprudence.147 Therefore, to explain North Dakota’s takings
jurisprudence, this section examines the progression of property ownership
through an analysis of the state’s police power and eminent domain and
inverse condemnation actions.
1.

North Dakota’s State Police Power

Under the North Dakota State Constitution, the police power provides
state and local governments broad authority to enact land-use regulations
without having to compensate landowners for restrictions placed upon the
use of their property.148 More specifically, government regulations and
ordinances do not constitute takings of property for public use simply because they diminish property value or disallow the best and highest use of
property.149 Instead, government regulations only constitute takings for

144. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16.
145. Grand Forks-Traill Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d 344, 346 (N.D. 1987).
146. Id.
147. Minch v. City of Fargo, 332 N.W.2d 71, 72-73 (N.D. 1983).
148. L.A. Braunagel v. City of Devils Lake, 2001 ND 118, ¶ 16, 629 N.W.2d 567, 572; see,
e.g., Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d at 346 (acknowledging the North Dakota Supreme Court’s recognition of
the state’s authority to enact land use regulations under its police power); Rippley v. City of
Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D. 1983) (providing that the state has broad authority to enact
land use regulations under its police power without having to compensate landowners for the
restrictions placed on their property); Kraft v. Malone, 313 N.W.2d 758, 761 (1981), overruled on
other grounds by Shark v. Thompson, 373 N.W.2d 859 (N.D. 1985) (recognizing the broad
authority of the state to enact land use regulations through an exercise of its police power); Eck v.
City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193, 197 (N.D. 1979) (acknowledging the state’s broad authority
under its police power to enact land use regulations without having to compensate property
owners whose land has been restricted).
149. See, e.g., L.A. Braunagel, ¶ 16, 629 N.W.2d at 572 (“A zoning ordinance does not
constitute a taking of property for public use merely because it diminishes the value of the
regulated property or disallows the best and highest use of the property.”); Rippley, 330 N.W.2d at
507 (“[A] zoning ordinance . . . does not constitute a taking for which compensation must be paid
merely because it diminishes the value of the regulated property or disallows the best and highest
use of the property.”); Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197 (“A zoning ordinance . . . will withstand
constitutional scrutiny even though it diminishes the value of the regulated property or disallows a
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public use when they deprive a landowner of all or substantially all reasonable uses of their property.150 Additionally, when determining if a restriction amounts to a taking, the court looks to the effect that it has on property
as a whole, rather than the effect on individual interests.151
The state’s power to impose land use regulations under its police power
is not without limits.152 Regulations must bear a reasonable relationship to
a legitimate governmental purpose.153 Moreover, these regulations must not
be arbitrary or deprive a property owner of all, or substantially all, reasonable uses of his land.154 Despite these limitations, the state’s police power
remains an important method of internal regulation.155 The police power
affords the state the ability to preserve public order and insures to property
owners the uninterrupted enjoyment and use of their property so long as this
use does not interfere with the identical rights of other property owners.156
In addition to the police power, both federal and state governments also
possess the power to take private property for public use through their
inherent power of eminent domain.157
2.

Eminent Domain and Inverse Condemnation Actions

The North Dakota Supreme Court has experienced difficulty distinguishing the State’s police power from its power of eminent domain.158 In
fact, the court has specifically stated that:
The characterization of the State’s action as a noncompensable
regulation under the police power as opposed to a compensable
use that the property owner considers to be the most valuable use of his property.”) (internal
citations omitted).
150. See L.A. Braunagel, ¶ 16, 629 N.W.2d at 572 (reiterating the above stated principle);
Rippley, 330 N.W.2d at 507 (providing that takings of this sort entitle a landowner to just
compensation through claims of inverse condemnation); Kraft, 313 N.W.2d at 761 (stating that
land use regulations must not “deprive a property owner of all or substantially all reasonable uses”
of their land).
151. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d at 346-47. In its application of this rule, otherwise known as the
“parcel-as-a-whole rule,” the North Dakota Supreme Court has specifically relied upon Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Id. Keystone asserted that a
property owner possesses a bundle of property rights and “[t]he destruction of one ‘strand’ of the
bundle [of property rights] is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 480 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)); see also Hjelle, 413
N.W.2d at 347 (holding that a regulation, which deprived a property owner of one particular
future use of their property, did not diminish the value or usefulness of the premises as a whole).
152. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Thomas, supra note 52, at 501.
156. Id.
157. Slipka, supra note 46, at 179.
158. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 198.
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taking under the power of eminent domain is not susceptible to
any easy formulation, but, rather, often turns on difference of
degree. [After all,] [b]oth involve some curtailment of private
property rights.159
The State’s power of eminent domain provides the state the authority to
“take” or “damage” private property for public use if the private property
owner is compensated for the taking or damaging.160 To enforce this
power, the State effectuates a taking of private property through eminentdomain proceedings.161
In addition to eminent domain proceedings, inverse condemnation
actions can be applied to situations in which private property has been taken
or damaged without an owner’s consent and where condemnation proceedings have not occurred.162 In these situations, an inverse condemnation
claim may be brought to afford a property owner the constitutional guarantee of just compensation in the occurrence of a property taking.163 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has explained that “[a] landowner
cannot force a permanent taking upon [a] governmental body if the taking is
reversible and the government wants to halt [it].”164
159. Id. (quoting Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 755 (N.D. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 440 U.S. 901 (1979)) (internal citations omitted).
160. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197. “Just compensation in eminent domain [actions] has come to
mean a fair market value standard of what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.” Kirk,
supra note 50, at 905.
161. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197. The power of eminent domain is believed to be of political
necessity. Foncello, supra note 45, at 672.
The sovereign would find it difficult, if not impossible, to construct highways, bridges,
sewers, waterlines, or any other public necessities that may arise, without the power of
eminent domain. It would be difficult for the government to piece together enough
voluntary transactions to complete one of these projects. The high transaction costs
associated with trying to find the landowners and then to successfully negotiate a fair
price may deter progress and frustrate public goals. The government can bypass these
difficulties by exercising the right of eminent domain.
Id.
162. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 198.
163. Id. at 198-99 (quoting Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 3 N.W.2d 808, 817 (1942)).
“Inverse condemnation is defined as ‘a cause of action against a governmental defendant to
recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency.’” Foncello, supra note 45, at 673-74 (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257
(1980)). Inverse condemnation claims are deemed to be inverse “because the landowner rather
than the government institutes the proceedings for condemnation.” Kirk, supra note 49, at 906.
164. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 511 (N.D. 1983). Instead, under its police
power, a governmental body can choose to rescind a regulation. Id. However, under these
circumstances, the governmental body is still required to compensate the property owner for a
temporary taking which is “measured by the time period between the date the regulation took
effect and the date it was rescinded.” Id. On the other hand, if the government should choose to
retain the regulation, the landowner is entitled to compensation for a permanent taking of this
property. Id.
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Additionally, in Eck v. City of Bismarck,165 the North Dakota Supreme
Court determined that an action of inverse condemnation must have
substantial support.166 A property owner may not rely entirely on a mere
reduction in their property’s market value to support his or her claim.167 In
general, a property owner’s damage can be characterized as the special
damage sustained in excess of that experienced by the general public.168
In Eck, a property owner brought an inverse condemnation suit against
the City of Bismarck for limiting the owner’s land uses by the city’s
enactment of, and later refusal to amend, a zoning ordinance.169 The court
recognized that “in every North Dakota case concerning an action for
inverse condemnation . . . the alleged taking or damaging resulted from a
[d]irect physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, that the
property owner enjoyed in connection with his property.”170 In these cases,
the government went beyond merely regulating private property use and

165. 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979).
166. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197-98.
167. Id.; see also L.A. Braunagel v. City of Devil’s Lake, 2001 ND 118, ¶ 19, 629 N.W.2d
567, 573 (“[A] mere reduction in the market value of property cannot serve as the basis for an
inverse condemnation claim.”).
168. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 199.
169. Id. at 195.
170. Id. at 199; see Filler v. City of Minot, 281 N.W.2d 237, 244 (N.D. 1979) (finding
damages in the form of a loss of visibility between traffic on the highway and the landowner’s
property); Guerard v. State, 220 N.W.2d 525, 529 (N.D. 1974) (“[A] [d]iversion of public traffic
does not create a right to compensation.”); Maragos v. City of Minot, 191 N.W.2d 570, 572 (N.D.
1971) (holding that the six year statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation
action); Jamestown Plumbing & Heating Co. v. City of Jamestown, 164 N.W.2d 355, 362 (N.D.
1969) (“[N]o legal damage results where traffic is diverted by authorities and incidental loss
ensues.”); Wilson v. City of Fargo, 141 N.W.2d 727, 732 (N.D. 1965) (holding that a municipal
corporation is liable for any consequential damages that result during an exercise of its eminent
domain power); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Morton County, 131 N.W.2d 557, 568 (N.D. 1964) (finding
that the state may be sued in cases arising under contract for damages resulting from the public
use of private property); Kenner v. City of Minot, 98 N.W.2d 901, 907 (N.D. 1959) (determining
that a landowner cannot recover damages for a public improvement unless it could not have been
reasonably anticipated by the landowner); Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603, 614 (N.D.
1957) (holding that the relocation of a highway grade resulted in a taking warranting
compensation); Kinnischtzke v. City of Glenn Ullin, 57 N.W.2d 588, 596-97 (N.D. 1953)
(determining that a municipality is liable for the damages that occur as a result of its negligence);
Conlon v. City of Dickinson, 5 N.W.2d 411, 414-15 (N.D. 1942) (finding that a landowner
deserved to be compensated for damage to property that was both extensive and resulted in a
reduction of the property’s rental value); Messer v. City of Dickinson, 3 N.W.2d 241, 252 (N.D.
1942) (affirming the trial court’s decision which granted damages to a property owner as
compensation for a nuisance maintained on the property); Hamilton v. City of Bismarck, 300
N.W. 631, 634 (N.D. 1941) (holding that the City of Bismarck was not liable to the plaintiff for
damages resulting from an unusual and unanticipated incident); King v. Stark County, 271 N.W.
771, 774-75 (N.D. 1937) (applying the rule of reasonableness when determining if just
compensation is required); Mayer v. Studer & Manion Co., 262 N.W. 925, 927 (N.D. 1935)
(concluding that because the property owner’s claim was based on negligence, no “obligation to
compensate for private property taken or damaged for public use” existed).
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instead disturbed the owner’s property rights.171 The North Dakota
Supreme Court hesitated to significantly extend the reach of inverse condemnation.172 Accordingly, the court refused to compensate the property
owner for the City of Bismarck’s mere enactment of and refusal to amend
an ordinance.173
North Dakota courts are hesitant to support inverse condemnation actions because these actions can have severe consequences.174 For example,
inverse condemnation actions can prevent or inhibit land-use planning and
cause a community to suffer staggering financial burdens.175 However,
claims of inverse condemnation can be useful and appropriate in certain
instances.176 Specifically, these claims are appropriate when a governmental entity has prohibited all, or substantially all, reasonable uses of property
and thereby displaced the property owner’s interest.177
In Rippley v. City of Lincoln,178 a property owner brought a claim of
inverse condemnation against the City of Lincoln following the enactment
of a comprehensive zoning ordinance.179 This zoning ordinance rezoned
twenty acres of the property owner’s land from residential use to public use
in order to accommodate future construction plans.180 Following the enactment of this ordinance, the City of Lincoln failed to initiate eminent domain
proceedings or to compensate the property owners for the taking.181 As a
result, the property owners began an inverse condemnation claim and
asserted that the zoning ordinance constituted a taking of their land through
its deprivation of all reasonable uses.182
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the property owner’s
inverse condemnation claim for just compensation was appropriate because
the property owner had been deprived of all reasonable use of his
property.183 The Rippley court reiterated the United States Constitution’s
demand for just compensation when regulatory takings, and takings in
171. Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 199.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 200-01.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 201.
177. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D. 1983).
178. 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983).
179. Rippley, 330 N.W.2d at 506.
180. Id. This zoning ordinance placed the property owner’s land in a public use zone, which
was to be used solely for governmental purposes and prohibited all residential, commercial, and
industrial uses. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 509.
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general, occur.184 This demand requires that compensation be paid for the
duration of the regulation from the moment that it first amounted to a taking
until the date that it is rescinded or otherwise amended.185 A regulation is
not rendered any less of a constitutional taking simply because the government is able to rescind or amend the regulation and make it temporary in
nature.186 Furthermore, in its decision, the court acknowledged that the
Takings Clause does not require that a taking be both permanent and irrevocable.187
Ultimately, the Rippley court determined that a taking can be temporary in nature and entitle a landowner to just compensation.188 As long as
landowners are able to prove that a government regulation deprived them of
all reasonable use of their property, landowners are justified in being compensated.189 Nevertheless, the court stressed that landowners cannot force a
permanent taking on the government if the taking is reversible and the
government chooses to end the taking.190
Takings jurisprudence at both the state and federal levels has evolved
significantly yet continues to remain relatively unsettled.191 The Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause requirement that the government pay just
compensation for any private land taken for a public purpose appears
straightforward.192 In application, however, the question of what actually
constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment has proven to be a question
of considerable difficulty.193 As a result, the Takings Clause has become a
source of frequent discussion under the Constitution as its precedent
evolves due to the unending litigation that arises as regulations continue to
invade many aspects of modern life.194

184. Id. at 510.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 511.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Foncello, supra note 45, at 667.
192. Id.
193. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (“The
question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a
problem of considerable difficulty.”).
194. Foncello, supra note 45, at 667-68.
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III. ANALYSIS
The decision in Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo,195
written by Chief Justice VandeWalle, unanimously affirmed the district
court’s holding that the City of Fargo’s moratorium on building permits did
not amount to a taking of Wild Rice’s property under either the federal or
state constitution.196 Three arguments were presented by Wild Rice as a
basis for its takings claim.197 First, Wild Rice claimed that the moratorium
amounted to a per se categorical taking.198 Next, Wild Rice claimed that
even if the moratorium was not a per se categorical taking, a taking still occurred under the Penn Central analysis.199 Finally, based on the principles
presented in Rippley v. City of Lincoln, Wild Rice claimed that the City of
Fargo was required to provide just compensation for the alleged taking.200
Additionally, Wild Rice argued that the trial court erred in adopting the
proposed findings, conclusions and order presented by the City of Fargo
without affording notice to Wild Rice.201 Wild Rice also argued that the
trial court erred when it allowed the city to include certain facts and case
law in its findings and conclusions, which had not originally been determined by the trial court.202 The North Dakota Supreme Court found the
argument to be without merit and ultimately held that “Fargo’s [twentyone]-month moratorium on building permits did not constitute a taking of
Wild Rice’s property under the federal and state constitutions.”203
A. CATEGORICAL TAKING
Wild Rice argued that the moratorium imposed by Fargo amounted to a
per se categorical taking of its development property because it denied all
economically viable use of the property.204 Wild Rice relied upon the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas, which provided that when a property
owner is required to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of their land

195. 2005 ND 193, 705 N.W.2d 850.
196. Wild Rice, ¶¶ 1, 35, 705 N.W.2d at 852, 861-62.
197. Id. ¶¶ 18, 21, 28, 705 N.W.2d at 856-57, 859-60.
198. Id. ¶ 18, 705 N.W.2d at 856.
199. Id. ¶ 21, 705 N.W.2d at 857.
200. Id. ¶ 28, 705 N.W.2d at 859-60.
201. Id. ¶ 34, 705 N.W.2d at 861.
202. Id.
203. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. In addition to the trial court’s dismissal of Wild Rice’s inverse
condemnation claim, the trial court also issued an order that denied Wild Rice’s post-trial motions.
Id. ¶ 1, 705 N.W.2d at 852.
204. Id. ¶ 18, 705 N.W.2d at 856.
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for the common good, a taking has occurred.205 However, the North Dakota
Supreme Court did not accept Wild Rice’s argument.206 Through its
reliance on the decision in Tahoe-Sierra, the court determined that the
taking in Lucas was materially different than the one alleged due to Fargo’s
moratorium.207
The moratorium imposed by the City of Fargo was merely temporary
in nature, lasting only twenty-one months, and preserved the future value of
Wild Rice’s lots.208 Distinguishing this situation from that in Lucas, the
North Dakota Supreme Court stressed that the Lucas decision was carved
out only for those “‘extraordinary case[s]’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value[.]”209 In all other cases, the North
Dakota Supreme Court found that Penn Central provided the appropriate
default rule.210
B. PENN CENTRAL ANALYSIS
The analysis presented in Penn Central has been recognized as a
default takings rule requiring a fact specific inquiry.211 The three factors involved in the Penn Central analysis are: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation; (2) the interference with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government’s action.212 Relying on this
analysis, Wild Rice argued that Fargo’s moratorium resulted in a taking.213
1.

Economic Impact

Wild Rice argued that the first factor in the Penn Central analysis was
met because it suffered an economic impact of approximately $500,000.214
This economic impact resulted from the monetary investment placed in the

205. Id. at 856-57; see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (determining that when regulations result in a deprivation of this magnitude a taking has likely occurred
because it is less likely that the benefits and burdens of economic life are merely being readjusted
by the legislature).
206. Wild Rice, ¶ 19, 705 N.W.2d at 857.
207. Id. In Lucas, the property owner was barred from erecting any permanent habitable
structures on his land which ultimately rendered his property valueless for both present and future
purposes. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
208. Wild Rice, ¶ 19, 705 N.W.2d at 857.
209. Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 330-31 (2002)).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. ¶ 13, 705 N.W.2d at 855.
213. Id. ¶ 21, 705 N.W.2d at 857.
214. Id. ¶ 22.
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property from 1992 through 1999.215 The trial court found that Wild Rice
did not suffer an economic impact because it retained economically viable
use of its property during the twenty-one months that the moratorium was
in place.216 The court based this reasoning on the principle that “mere
fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decision-making,
absent extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership . . . [and] cannot be
considered a taking in the constitutional sense.”217
Furthermore, Wild Rice retained future economic value in its property.218 Because the moratorium was only temporary in nature, Wild Rice
still preserved its ability to sell and develop the property when the moratorium was removed.219 The North Dakota Supreme Court also acknowledged that:
[T]he focus of the economic impact criterion is the change in fair
market value of the subject property caused by the regulatory
imposition measured by comparing the market value of the
property immediately before the governmental action with the
market value of the same property immediately after the action is
terminated.220
In this case, the trial court found that Wild Rice could sell its lots for
higher prices post-moratorium than pre-moratorium.221 Where the property
owner experiences a profit following application of a regulation, it is
unlikely that a court will find that a taking has resulted.222 Therefore, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly found that

215. Id. These investments were primarily in response to governmental mandates such as the
requirement of a public sewer system and road infrastructure, which the governmental entities
required for development. Id.
216. Id. ¶ 23.
217. Id. at 858 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002)).
218. See id. ¶ 25, 705 N.W.2d at 859 (“Wild Rice sold more lots at higher prices after the
moratorium was lifted than it did before the moratorium became effective.”).
219. Id.
220. Id. “The focus of [the economic impact] factor is on the change in fair market value of
the subject property caused by the regulatory imposition. In other words, the court must compare
the value that has been taken away from the property with the value that remains in the property.”
Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 460, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (internal citations
omitted). See, e.g., Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 115, 123 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (stating
that the economic impact factor is to be measured by comparing the property’s market value
immediately before the governmental action with the property’s market value immediately after
the action); Leon County, 873 So. 2d at 467 (providing that the economic impact factor requires a
plaintiff to establish that the regulation in question caused a serious financial loss).
221. Wild Rice, ¶ 25, 705 N.W.2d at 859.
222. Id.; see Leon County, 873 So. 2d at 467 (holding that no taking had occurred where a
landowner sold their property for a profit of $500,000 following the removal of a temporary
moratorium).

1078

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:1053

the temporary reduction in value suffered by Wild Rice was not sufficient
to amount to an economic impact under the Penn Central analysis.223 The
court then proceeded to analyze Wild Rice’s claim under the second factor
of the Penn Central analysis, an interference with investment-backed
expectations.224
2.

Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations

Wild Rice argued that the moratorium interfered with investmentbacked expectations because it had invested $500,000 into the property but
was unable to sell residential lots due to the City of Fargo’s imposition of
the moratorium.225 Based on its findings, the trial court determined that
although Wild Rice had projected it would sell four lots per year, it had
experienced difficulty doing so since its creation.226 In fact, the trial court
specifically found that many factors in addition to the moratorium affected
Wild Rice’s investment over the years.227 As a result, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that “Wild Rice’s investment-backed expectations were unreasonable.”228 Following this determination, the court began
its analysis of the third and final factor under the Penn Central analysis, the
character of the governmental action.229
3.

Character of the Governmental Action

Wild Rice argued that the City of Fargo’s governmental action was
“characterized by bad faith.”230 Specifically, it claimed that the city used
the moratorium to prevent construction on Wild Rice’s property.231 Wild
Rice also asserted that the City of Fargo was attempting to obtain federal
funding to purchase the property at a lesser price without the need for
223. Wild Rice, ¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d at 858.
224. Id. ¶ 24.
225. Id. ¶ 22, 705 N.W.2d at 857.
226. Id. ¶ 24, 705 N.W.2d at 858. During the period of 1994 through 1998, which was prior
to the imposition of the moratorium, Wild Rice had only sold one lot to an outside party even
though it had enlisted a realtor experienced in river developments and had benefited from a twoyear tax exemption offer. Id.
227. Id. at 858-59. The property where the lots were located was prone to flooding and all
but two of the lots were covered by water as a result of the 1997 flood. Id. at 858. The lots also
experienced additional flooding in 2001, and prospective buyers expressed concern regarding the
potential for future flooding or water issues. Id.
228. Id. ¶ 24, 705 N.W.2d at 859.
229. Id. ¶ 26.
230. Id. ¶ 22, 705 N.W.2d at 857. Wild Rice claimed that the city had not conducted any
reviews or studies in order to create new ordinances that would be applicable to its property while
the moratorium was in place. Id. Additionally, it claimed that the moratorium was lifted only
after the impacted landowners brought claims of inverse condemnation. Id.
231. Id.
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compensation.232 The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that “[a]n
extraordinary delay in governmental decisionmaking coupled with bad faith
on the part of the governmental body may result in a compensable taking of
property.”233 The trial court determined, however, that the City’s moratorium was a reasonable and appropriate land use regulation based on the
devastation and damage caused by the flood.234
The City contended that it was necessary to use the moratorium to
maintain the status quo.235 Moreover, the moratorium afforded the City an
opportunity to prepare and review plans to correct problems caused by the
flood and to prevent similar devastation from reoccurring.236 Additionally,
the moratorium applied to all of the land located within the preliminary
designated floodway, not only the lands belonging to Wild Rice.237 As a
result, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded, in accordance with the
trial court’s decision, that the moratorium bore a reasonable or rational basis
to a legitimate government purpose and that the City of Fargo had acted
with proper diligence and good faith.238 Additionally, based on its application of the Penn Central analysis as a whole, the North Dakota Supreme
Court ultimately determined that the City of Fargo’s temporary moratorium
did not result in an unconstitutional taking of Wild Rice’s property.239
Following its decision that Wild Rice’s claim did not amount to a taking
under the Penn Central analysis, the court proceeded to address Wild
Rice’s final argument that it was entitled to compensation for the alleged
taking of its property.240

232. Id.
233. Id. ¶ 26, 705 N.W.2d at 859; see Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (determining that a taking can result when an extraordinary delay occurs in
the governmental decisionmaking process); Appollo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 717,
737 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (recognizing that takings can result from extraordinary delays in the governmental decisionmaking process only upon a finding of extreme circumstances); Wyatt v. United
States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (providing that takings may occur through
extraordinary delays in the governmental decisionmaking process, but acknowledging that a delay
must be substantial and that delays lasting up to eight years have been condoned by the Supreme
Court); Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 620 S.E.2d 76, 82 (S.C. 2005) (holding that a two-month delay
did not amount to a taking).
234. Wild Rice, ¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d at 858.
235. Id.
236. Id. ¶ 26, 705 N.W.2d at 859. The City of Fargo claimed to apply the moratorium in an
effort to “determine if it was safe to build in flood prone areas.” Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. ¶¶ 23, 26, 705 N.W.2d at 858-59.
239. Id. ¶ 27, 705 N.W.2d at 859.
240. Id. ¶ 28, 705 N.W.2d at 859-60.
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C. COMPENSATION
In its final argument, Wild Rice claimed, based on the principles set
forth in Rippley v. City of Lincoln, that it was entitled to compensation for
the temporary taking of its property by the City of Fargo.241 Wild Rice
argued that it was entitled to compensation from the City of Fargo “for the
interim period between the enactment of the moratorium and the date the
moratorium was lifted.”242 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court
determined that the reasoning employed in Rippley was not appropriate in
this case.243 Unlike the property owners in Rippley who experienced a
permanent taking and were deprived of all reasonable use of their property,
the moratorium was only temporary in nature and did not deprive Wild Rice
of all economically beneficial use.244
Additionally, Wild Rice claimed that the City of Fargo failed to
properly plead abandonment of the moratorium because the City did not
allege in its answer or amend it to state that the moratorium had been
removed.245 Wild Rice once again based its claim on the reasoning in
Rippley, which the court found to be inappropriate because it did not
specifically address pleading requirements in an inverse condemnation
claim.246 Also, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that all parties
were aware of the moratorium’s termination well before the beginning of
the trial because the City had alleged in its answer that the moratorium was
only temporary.247 As a result, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that Wild Rice’s claim for compensation was meritless.248
IV. IMPACT
The likely consequence of the court’s decision in Wild Rice is that in
situations of temporary regulatory takings, the appropriate method of analysis will be an ad hoc factual inquiry, instead of a per se categorical rule.249
A balancing test of this kind provides an accurate way to balance the
interests of individual property owners against the importance of land use
planning in our modern system.250 This balancing of expectations is the

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id. ¶ 32, 705 N.W.2d at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 31, 705 N.W.2d at 860.
Id.
Id. at 860-61.
Id. at 861.
Nolan, supra note 40, at 749.
Id. at 749-50.
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best way to determine the role that property should play in our society.251
After all, this test is the sole means by which courts are able to take into
consideration the notion of fairness and justice and produce a just outcome
in takings litigation.252
Although it is important to reach a fair and just outcome in takings
cases, the court’s decision in Wild Rice also acknowledges the importance
of land use planning devices.253 The court specifically discusses the importance of moratoria, which are recognized as “fundamental to a rational,
defensible, planning process.”254 The decision is also highly supportive of
the ability of governments to engage in land use planning and appears to
epitomize the deference afforded to governments in their enactment of land
use regulations through their police power.255 However, notions of fairness
also reinforce the need for the moratorium power to be limited to prevent
governments from exercising their power arbitrarily and in a way that
inhibits public involvement.256
The court’s decision in Wild Rice, like that in Tahoe-Sierra, failed to
put a precise limit on, or to define circumstances under which a moratorium
could amount to a taking.257 Instead, the court relied on the trial court’s
determination that the moratorium was “reasonable” and “appropriate.” 258
The vagueness and ambiguity surrounding these terms will likely result in
significant future litigation because the court will be forced to define what
constitutes an appropriate and reasonable moratorium under the facts of
each case.259

251. Id. at 748.
252. Id. at 749-50. “Fairness and justice might suggest that the individual claim of right
should be protected to the utmost extent as the foundation upon which the American system is
built.” Id. at 749. However, “while land-use planning becomes more important in modern
society, the desire for a practical arrangement and a conception of property that will work
efficiently, and promote fairness and justice, must be the desired end of the Court.” Id. at 749-50.
253. Wild Rice, ¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d at 858 (referencing the trial court’s determination that the
moratorium imposed by the City of Fargo was “a reasonable, appropriate land-use regulation”).
254. Freilich, supra note 16, at 600; see also Dumas, supra note 69, at 236 (recognizing “the
importance of temporary prohibitions on development for successful land-use planning”).
255. See Oshiro, supra note 86, at 181 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s decision in
Tahoe-Sierra, which involved a temporary moratorium and was not found to be a taking entitling
the property owner to compensation, represented a “shift from a pro-property rights direction to
one supporting land use planning”).
256. Nolan, supra note 40, at 750.
257. Id.
258. Wild Rice, ¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d at 858.
259. See Freilich, supra note 16, at 601 (discussing how the reasonableness of moratoriums
is measured).
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Also similar to Tahoe-Sierra, the Wild Rice decision appears to evidence the North Dakota Supreme Court’s support of land use planning.260
The decision could specifically harm property owners by enabling governments to simply label any prohibition or regulation as “temporary” or to
place a set amount of time on a regulation to maintain its constitutionality.261 By allowing governmental units this luxury, the ability of North
Dakota landowners to bring claims of inverse condemnation, and to obtain
compensation for temporary takings, appears to have been significantly reduced.262 After all, courts are already hesitant to support inverse condemnation claims because these claims can have severe consequences through
their ability to prevent or inhibit land use planning.263 Additionally, these
claims can cause communities to suffer staggering financial burdens.264
In 2006, the North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in Knutson v. City
of Fargo265 further limited the ability of property owners to bring claims of
inverse condemnation.266 The court’s decision requires a property owner to
prove that an alleged taking or damage occurred as the result of a deliberate
act on the part of the governing body.267 The Knutson and Wild Rice decisions reduce the remedies available to property owners and reveal the North
Dakota Supreme Court’s support of land use planning.268
As a whole, the Wild Rice decision is representative of the ever present
debate regarding the meaning of property and the government’s role in both
regulating and protecting private property.269 Moreover, although it appears
to demonstrate a modern trend in support of land use planners, “private
property has been in existence for a very long time and . . . successful
societies and governments tend to protect rights in private property.”270

260. See Oshiro, supra note 86, at 181 (discussing the fact that the Tahoe-Sierra decision
represented the United States Supreme Court’s “shift from a pro-property rights direction to one
supporting land use planning”). In Tahoe-Sierra, “[t]he pro-property rights trend seemingly
halted when Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, who typically sided with the conservative faction,
changed sides and held in favor of the land use planners.” Id.
261. Nolan, supra note 40, at 750.
262. See Knutson v. City of Fargo, 2006 ND 97, ¶ 15, 714 N.W.2d 44, 50 (requiring a
landowner to prove that a taking is the result of a deliberate act).
263. Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193, 200-01 (N.D. 1979).
264. Id.
265. 2006 ND 97, 714 N.W.2d 44.
266. Knutson, ¶ 15, 714 N.W.2d at 50.
267. Id.
268. See id. ¶ 15 (denying a property owner’s inverse condemnation claim); Wild Rice River
Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 2005 ND 193, ¶ 27, 705 N.W.2d 850, 859 (denying a property
owner’s inverse condemnation claim).
269. A Short History of Regulatory Takings, supra note 72, at 43.
270. Id.
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Therefore, it is doubtful that Wild Rice serves to foreshadow a “long term
abandonment of either individual rights or individual property rights.”271
V. CONCLUSION
In Wild Rice, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a temporary
taking in the form of a twenty-one month moratorium did not constitute a
taking under the federal and North Dakota constitutions.272 In this case,
Wild Rice claimed that it was deprived of all economically beneficial use of
its property during the twenty-one months that the moratorium was in place,
and therefore, it was entitled to compensation for that time.273 The court
determined that although a property owner may not possess a present ability
to use his property when land use regulations such as moratoriums are
imposed, future use and potential remains with the property.274 Therefore,
the court’s decision ultimately determined that temporary takings do not
render property valueless, and, subsequently, takings of this kind do not
entitle property owners to just compensation.275
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271. Id.
272. Wild Rice, ¶ 35, 705 N.W.2d at 861.
273. Id. ¶ 32.
274. Id. ¶ 30, 32, 705 N.W.2d at 860-61.
275. Id. ¶ 32, 705 N.W.2d at 861.
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